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As a check on the accuracy of the estimating equation, revenue estimates f1 
the 26 existing racing states with complete data are compared to actual reven 
The average estimate error is calculated by squaring the difference between t"' 
estimate and actual revenue, dividing by 26 and taking the square root. 
average error is $7.8 million, 40 percent of the 26 state revenue average of$19·' 
million. For comparison, estimates were made by multiplying national 
capita revenue, $3.36 per thousand, by each state's population. Indiana, 
revenue estimate is $18.5 million using this method. However, the average erri · 
for the 26 racing states is $18.8 million, or96 percent ofaverage revenue. Clead 
the regression equation estimates are much more accurate than the per capi 
based estimates. 
Even under the most optimistic assumptions, the amount of revenue whicl 
Indiana could likely raise by taxing horse race wagering is insignificant conf 
pared to the state's annual budget of about $7 billion. Under various por 
assumptions, the sta:te could raise between $2 and $14 million from such taxi . 
with $5 million the most likely estimate within that range. The $11.5 millio1' 
estimate made at the time of the 1977 parimutuel law debate appears to be big 
The debate on the legalization of horse race wagering should thus focus not 
its tax revenue potential, but on the merits of the activity itself - its entertai 
ment value, and its social and economic consequences. 
NOTES 
I. The Indianapolis Star, 20 January and 25 March 1977, 6 January 1979. For the 1977 India 
Parimutuel Law see Laws of Indiana, 1977, vol. I, P.L. 47. For the 1979 Indiana Supre 
Court decision see State of Indiana; Hoosier Horse Industries, Inc. v. Joseph H. Nixon, 
N.E. 2d 152. 
2. The National Association of State Racing Commissioners, Pari-Mutuel Racing, 1984 (Lexin 
ton, KY.: 1985). 
3. A Gruen, "An Inquiry into the Economics of Race-Track Gambling," Journal of Politi 
Economy 84 (February, 1976 ): 169-77; D. B. Suits, "The Elasticity of Demand for Gambling,, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 93 (February, 1979): 155-62; W. A. Morgan and J. 
Vasche, "A Note on the Elasticity of Demand for Wagering," Applied Economics 14 (Octobe~ 
1982): 469-74. Morgan and Vasche find the elasticity of the handle to be-1.3, Gruen gets-l .57i 
and Suits' estimates range from -1.59 to -2.73. 
4. R. S. Guthrie, "Taxing Horse Race Gambling: The Revenue Potential," Public Finan, 
Quarter(v 9 (January, 1981): 79-90. 
5. D. Pescatrice, "The Inelastic Demand for Wagering," Applied Economics 12 (March, 1980' 
1-10. 
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Costs of State Vehicle and 
Driver Licensing in Indiana: 
A Comparison with Other States* 
MARILYN K. SPENCER 
ROBERTS. MAIN 
Butler University 
I ndiana is unique as the only state of the union to rely upon the 
political patronage system for the actual provision of vehicle and driver licensing 
services, with coordination and data collection handled by the State Bureau of 
Motor Vehicles. The governor appoints the Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Motor Vehicles (BMV), who appoints a manager recommended by the party 
chairman in each of the 92 counties. The county license branches are allowed to 
keep a specified amount of the revenues collected (retained revenues). The 
remainder of the revenues accrues to the state's Motor Vehicle Highway 
Accounts, except a small amount that the other major party collects from 
personalized license plates. The disposition of the funds retained by the license 
branches is at the discretion of the county party chairmen. Some portion of those 
funds offsets the costs of running the branches, and some portion accrues to the 
county party. 
We compare the costs in Indiana to what we would expect them to be, given 
the costs in the other states. This comparison sheds light on whether Indiana has 
higher or lower costs, once we control for relevant output and input differences. 
Political patronage may provide services at lower resource cost than government 
bureaucracy. Even though each county party chair is assured of a four-year 
monopoly following each gubernatorial election, a motive indeed exists to 
promote efficiency. Given that net revenues after paying operating costs accrue 
to the chairmen, they have a strong incentive to reduce operating costs. How-
ever, we have no reliable data on the actual costs incurred by the license 
branches. We know their cost is less than their retained revenues, but not how 
much less. Lower operating costs may not mean lower costs to taxpayers and 
licensees. 
For most of the states, costs of licensing are itemized in the budgets of their 
motor vehicle bureaus. However, they may not include the costs of buildings and 
grounds, which in Indiana are directly paid for by the license branches. 
*We wish to thank Duane Leatherman, Prem Sharma, John Brand, and numerous licensing officials 
of several states for their valuable contributions. 
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The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections including theory 
and evidence, methodology and empirical results, and the conclusions and 
policy implications. 
Economic theory suggests several reasons for a government provider to 
have higher costs than a private contracfor. The primary reason is that a 
government manager is not rewarded for reducing costs. Even in a large private 
corporation, a manager obtains some rewards for lowering costs. In contrast, a 
government manager tends to be rewarded for having a bigger bureau. Further, 
civil service requirements make firing unproductive employees more difficult. 
(See Williamson, 1964, Downs, 1965, Alchian, 1965, Alchianand Demsetz 1972, 
Bennett and Johnson 1980, and Spann 1977.) 
Several empirical studies have compared costs of private versus public 
provision of government services. We are not aware of any literature relating 
directly to driver and vehicle licensing, or to the comparison of the costs of , 
government versus patronage-private monopoly provision. Conceptually clos-
est to our research are studies concerning fire departments and refuse collection. 
Ahlbrandt (1973) compared of the costs of public provision of fire protection 
with the costs of a private fire department and found that private costs were 
approximately 47 percent less. Several refuse collection studies have come up 
with contradictory results, however. Hirsch (1965) found no significant differ-
ence between the costs of public and private organizations. Kemper and Quigley 
( 1976) and Stevens ( 1978) found private provision to be more costly than public, 
and competitive private provision to be more costly than monopoly private 
production. Kitchen (1976) and Bennett and Johnson (1979) found private 
provision to be substantially less costly than public provision. 
It is possible that public provision of vehicle and driver licensing is more 
costly than private provision. If so, competitive bidding for the right to provide 
these services would be expected to cost less. It is plausible that the noncompeti-
tive award of this right to county party chairmen is less costly as well. If ever they 
want to increase revenues per transaction, they must have those increases 
legislated. Most bureaucratic budget increases do not suffer that amount of 
public scrutiny. 
The next section discusses our test of the costs in Indiana, relative to 
provision elsewhere. 
The costs which a state administrative agency would incur to provide 
license branch service in Indiana can be estimated by examining other states. 
Theory suggests that the cost of providing these services depends on the number 
of transactions performed and other institutional and environmental factors. 
Our first procedure is to regress budgetary costs on these variables for the other 
states. The final equation is of the form: 
C. = a0 + a 1T + a2T
2 + a3 lnT + a4E· + u· 1 1 1 1 1 1 (I) 
J 
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where i represents the state, C is the budgetary cost, T is the number of 
automobile registrations, titles, and drivers' licenses issued, the transformations 
ofT measure economies of scale, equalling the square ofT and the natural log of 
T, E denotes the number of state employees, and u is the error term. 
With regression coefficient values from the other states, we then calculate 
Indiana's expected costs by inserting Indiana's observed values for the inde-
pendent variables into the equation 
"' c• = W' B (2) 
where c• is the predicted cost for Indiana, W' is the vector of values that the 
independent variables take in the state of Indiana, and S represents the esti-
mated coefficients from the regression. This estimated number is then compared 
to the sum of actual BMV costs and retained revenues. To test whether the 
current system results in significantly different costs, we apply a two-tailed t-test 
to the differential between actual and predicted costs. The interval around c• is 
of the form 
where 
c• "!: td12 s[1 + W'(X'xrl WJ 1/2 
t = (actual costs - calculated costs) / S, 
S is the standard error of estimate and X is the matrix of observations from the 
other states. 
Completion of the project required cooperation from state governments. 
Expecting that not all states would have up-to-date information, we asked for 
1981 data. Forty states responded, including Indiana, although missing data 
pared the usable observations down to 35. Not all states provide exactly the same 
services. We could only imperfectly adjust for this diversity. 
The equation represented in Table 1 is the least squares estimate of the costs 
of provision. The number of full-time equivalent state employees (EM-
PLOYEE) is significant and of the expected sign. EMPLOYEE is highly corre-
lated with all of the output variables, with simple correlations of 0.817, 0.899, 
and 0.592, respectively. Yet, surprisingly, it still exerts a strong individual 
influence on COST. 
Because registrations, titles, and licenses are all highly correlated with costs 
and each other, we added them together to obtain a measure of total transac-
tions. No a priori expectation was assigned to the portion of the function relating 
to output, since theory did not indicate whether scale economies should exist. 
The coefficients on transactions (OUTPUT), its square (OUTPUTSQ), and its 
natural log (LNOUTPUT) imply the existence of scale diseconomies throughout 
the entire range of output. 
c0.tiW"1!!?'Wft1 W4 
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TABLE 1. Cost as a Function of Output and Input Variables 
t-values 
Constant -15 537 x 104** 
' 
-3.500 
OUTPUT -3.79261** -3.356 
OUTPUTSQ 25.93863 x 10-8** 7.223 
LNOUTPUT 11,801 x 103** 3.642 
EMPLOYEE 6,795.03056** 3.208 
adjusted R2 .97819 
F 371.05116 
S.E.E. 47,787 x 102 
n 34 
*p < .05 
••p < .01 
Originally, we had included measures of population dispersion, other 
inputs and outputs, and contractual and institutional arrangements. Included in 
our population measures were its absolute size, the population density, and a 
Gini index. Other inputs and outputs considered were the costs oflicense plates, 
the frequency of their issuance, vehicle inspections, number of license branch 
offices, the number of offices leased, and the average monthly earnings of 
full-time state employees not involved in education. We created dummy varia-
bles for county and other non-state provision of titles and registrations and of 
driver licenses. None of these had significant explanatory power. 
Table 2 includes the actual values for the independent variables and cost of 
provision in the state oflndiana. We concluded that we could not reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.05 level of significance. Indiana costs were over $7 million 
higher than predicted. Although this difference was substantial, the actual 
Indiana costs were within the range predicted by the model. While the adjusted 
R2 was quite high, there was some variation in costs for all the states in the 
sample that was unaccounted for by the model. The purpose of the t-test is to 
judge whether Indiana costs are significantly different from what we would 
expect if they were drawn from the same population as the states in the sample. 
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a Source: Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles. 
63 
The next section will discuss the policy implications that the results of the 
study might indicate. 
The study suggests that the current Indiana system has resulted in costs that 
are not significantly different from costs in other states. If these results had 
indicated higher costs, this would not necessarily mean that the current system is 
less efficient than direct state provision. The level of service may be perceived as 
. higher under patronage than under direct state operation. If such a gain in 
consumer benefits outweighs the extra costs, the patronage system would be 
more efficient despite higher costs. A survey of individuals who purchase 
licenses is necessary to draw a conclusion concerning efficiency. Another con-
sideration in evaluating the efficiency of the current system is that the revenues 
retained by the license branches are greater than the costs of operation. Thus, 
costs that are not significantly lower may indicate that statutory rates of reten-
tion are too high. 
Even if the current system had been found to be significantly more efficient, 
we could not conclude that it is the most desirable system of providing licensing 
services for at least two reasons, First, the issue of the desirability of such a 
system has political and ethical dimensions which may outweigh any finding 
concerning narrowly defined economic efficiency. Second, regardless of how 
that political argument is resolved, there may be methods of organization which 
are preferable to either direct state operation or patronage, including competi-
tive bid contracting. 
In September 1985, Governor Orr stated that, for the sa~e of public 
confidence, he was recommending total state operation of the license branch 
system. However, he warned that costs of such a system would be substantially 
higher than with the present patronage system. Our findings indicate that a state 
system that is no less efficient than systems in other states should not cost 
substantially more. 
---·~r- 4 
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